Leaderless Decisions and Resource Exchange in Collective Foraging
Mathematics Colloquium
About the Event
Social insects routinely make effective collective decisions and distribute resources without leaders or centralized control, even in uncertain and time-varying environments. This raises a fundamental mathematical question: how can simple, local interaction rules give rise to efficient group-level behavior, and what trade-offs constrain such efficiency? In this talk, I present two complementary models of collective foraging and resource exchange in honeybees. At the decision-making level, I describe a decentralized foraging model in which individuals choose whether to explore or wait under uncertainty while sharing rewards across the group. Stochastic and decision-theoretic analysis shows that efficient collective performance emerges through a division of labor: a small, heterogeneous minority explores, while a synchronized majority commits only when conditions are favorable. At the level of within-hive dynamics, nectar exchange is modeled as a velocity-jump search process coupled to queueing at resource sites, where first-passage and asymptotic analysis reveal how search, congestion, and partial absorption determine scaling laws for resource-exchange cycle times. Together, these results show how leaderless collectives self-organize across scales, balancing efficiency and cost through simple stochastic rules.